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SECURITIES
Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Bath, brought suit against Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jo-
nas ("Bushkin"), a California partnership. Bath asserted that Bushkin
violated certain federal laws, including RICO and the Securities Ex-
change Act. The district court dismissed the claims, stating that they
were time barred. In making this determination, the district court ap-
plied a federal statute of limitations period. Bath subsequently
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. In making
its determination, the court considered three issues. First, the court
ruled that the proper statute of limitations for violations of Rule lOb-5
should be determined by the law of the state in which the violation oc-
curred. Second, since the district court erred in its choice of a limita-
tions period, the court addressed the issue of whether a private right of
action exists under section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act.
The court ruled that no private right of action exists under that section.
Third, the court determined that a cause of action under RICO begins
to accrue when the party learns, or should have learned, of both the
"existence" and "source" of the injury, and that the injury is part of a
pattern. Because the district court did not consider both injury and pat-
tern, the court vacated that portion of the judgment and remanded for
further consideration.
Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. United States, 897 F.2d 1549
Author: Judge Ebel
A warrant issued pursuant to federal securities laws authorized In-
ternal Revenue Service agents to seize various types of transaction and
sales records, as well as correspondence and memoranda from the of-
ficers of Blinder, Robinson & Company, Incorporated ("Blinder-Robin-
son"). Blinder-Robinson and Meyer Blinder filed an action pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) for return of various business records which they
alleged were illegally seized. The district court denied relief, holding
that the warrant was valid and the search lawful. While appeal was
pending, Meyer Blinder was indicted by a federal grand jury for securi-
ties violations. Blinder-Robinson was not indicted, however.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed Meyer Blinder's appeal for lack of ju-
risdiction and remanded for further proceedings to determine if
Blinder-Robinson was able to satisfy the equitable requirements for a
pre-indictment action under Rule 41 (e). The court stated that a motion
for the return of property is properly appealable only where it is not tied
to a criminal prosecution in esse against the movant. Therefore, the
court held that the appeal by Meyer Blinder should be dismissed for lack
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of appellate jurisdiction since it was tied to a criminal proceeding in esse.
Since Blinder-Robinson was not indicted, however, the appeal from the
district court's ruling was not tied to a criminal proceeding in esse, and
proper appellate jurisdiction could be exercised over it. Further, since
the record disclosed no findings regarding the irreparable injury and
inadequate remedies at law requirements for jurisdiction over a pre-in-
dictment Rule 41 (e) motion, the case was remanded to the district court.
The district court was ordered to determine if these equitable require-
ments for jurisdiction could be satisfied. In addition, the court noted
that the mere threat of imminent indictment did not establish irrepara-
ble injury. Also, the district court was authorized by Rule 41(e) to im-
pose reasonable conditions to protect access and use of the property in
subsequent proceedings.
Cascade Energy and Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557
Author: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Cascade Energy and Metals Corporation ("Cascade"),
owner and operator of a gold mine, brought suit seeking additional capi-
tal contributions from its investors, who asserted numerous counter-
claims. Cascade appealed the district court's determination that:
(1) the joint operating agreement did not permit additional assess-
ments; (2) Cascade and its owner, Weston, breached other fiduciary du-
ties to the investors; and (3) the affiliates of Cascade and Weston were
their alter egos. Defendants, investors, challenged the district court's
conclusion that: (1) Cascade and Weston did not commit fraud in the
offering of interests in the mine; and (2) the interests in the mine were
not securities.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the in-
vestors could not be required to make further capital contributions, and
that they should be relieved from any future payments. Also, sufficient
evidence existed to support the district court's finding that Weston and
Cascade breached their fiduciary duties. The two determined that initial
capital contributions were inadequate to put the mine into production,
later concealed the fact, and made further assessments. Moreover, the
court reversed the district court's decision to disregard the corporate
entity under the alter ego doctrine. Accordingly, the court held Wes-
ton's and Cascade's affiliates liable for the actions committed. The court
found many problems with the application of the alter ego doctrine in-
cluding the observances by Weston of many corporate formalities and
the absence of injustice arising from any non-observances. The court
further found that the district court's determination that there was no
fraud in the initial offering of interests was not clearly erroneous. Con-
sequently, that decision was affirmed. The court did agree with the in-
vestors that the interests in the mine were securities under both federal
and state law and, accordingly, reversed the district court on the issue.
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Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge Tacha
This case arose from an order by the Supreme Court vacating the
Tenth Circuit's previous judgment and remanding for further consider-
ation. Plaintiff, Holloway, was among several plaintiffs who invested
money with different banks. In return, Holloway received "thrift certifi-
cates" and "passbook savings certificates," as well as a promissory note
from the banks' holding company, defendant Republic Bancorporation,
Incorporated. The banks and the holding company later declared bank-
ruptcy. The question on appeal was whether the instruments were se-
curities within the meaning of federal securities laws.
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its decision. Accordingly, the court
ruled that the instruments in question were governed by securities laws.

